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Class Actions: Judicial Control of Defense
Communication with Absent Class Members
Class action litigation under rule 23' requires that the trial court take firm
control over the adversarial process to ensure a fair and efficient result. 2 At
each pretrial stage, difficult class action considerations are encountered, and
effective management is essential to prevent the action from being consumed
in "the jaws of potential chaos in multiparty adversary litigation. ' 3 Rule 23(d)4
gives a court discretion to accomplish its role as manager. Given the com-
plexity of the class action device and the potential for its abuse, appellate
courts have construed rule 23(d) in a manner which gives the trial court greater
discretion to regulate the conduct of litigation than it usually enjoys.5 The
United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated in a unanimous opinion
that federal district courts have "both the duty and broad authority to exer-
cise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the
conduct of counsel and parties." 6
As one aspect of their managerial power, district courts prior to 1981 fre-
quently entered orders or enacted local rules which regulated communication
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
2. 3 H. NEwBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3000 (1977); MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LmOA-
TON § 1.10 (4th ed. 1977). [Both this edition and the fifth edition, 1982, are cited throughout
this Note. Citation will be to MANUAL, with the specific edition noted.]
3. 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 3000, see also 7A C. W oirr & A. MILER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1791 (1972).
4. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d) provides:
Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies,
the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings
or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presen-
tation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members
of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given
in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity
of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate,
to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
(3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requir-
ing that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to represen-
tation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with
similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
5. See Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1334 (9th Cir. 1980); Bernard v. Gulf
Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); Weight Watchers
of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 1972).
6. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981).
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of named parties and counsel with active and nonactive, absent class members."
These "no-communication" orders and local rules commonly prohibited such
communication unless approved by the court in advance.' These district court
practices were based on recommendations by the Federal Judicial Center.9
As outlined in the Manual for Complex Litigation,'I
[t]his recommendation was made because of repeated instances, reported
by federal judges, of actual ex parte communications with class members
that impaired, frustrated, and adversely affected the administration of
justice. These reports demonstrated that the improper and unethical com-
munications were frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to detect
in time to prevent harm; that they had virtually unlimited variety in form
and content; and that opportunities for direct, great, and often irreparable
injury were better prevented than attempts made to repair the injury after
it had already occurred."
In June 1981, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Gulf Oil Co. v
Bernard.'" This decision provided the impetus for a complete policy reversal
concerning judicial screening of class action communications. Although the
Court specifically narrowed its ruling to proscribe only broad restraint of com-
munications with class members absent specific findings of fact, 3 the effect
of the ruling has been much greater. The Federal Judicial Center, on the basis
of Gulf, now recommends that all local no-communication rules be revoked,
and that severe restrictions be imposed on the use of such orders.' These
7. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1597 n.81 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 89 HAtv. L. REV.]; Comment, Restrictions on Communication by Class
Action Parties and Attorneys, 1980 DUKE L.J. 360, 366; Comment, Judicial Screening of Class
Action Communications, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 671, 673 (1980); Recent Decisions, Constitutional
Law, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 339, 348 n.55 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV.].
8. See Comment, supra note 7, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. at 671; Comment, Restrictions on Com-
munication by Class Action Parties and Attorneys, 1980 DUKE L.J. 360, 365.
9. The Federal Judicial Center was created by Congress in 1968 in recognition of "the acute
need for a modern program of long range research and planning for the courts." MANUAL (4th
ed. 1977) at vii.
The Manual for Complex Litigation ... is a semi-official text, together with recom-
mended forms, orders, and local rules, prepared by a committee of judges in the
Federal Judicial Center ... for the purpose of suggesting pretrial and trial pro-
cedures to facilitate "complex" cases. The procedures are only recommendations,
and are necessarily in general form. Accordingly, whether the recommended pro-
cedures are appropriate in any particular case must be carefully considered, by
members of the bench and bar alike.
3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, at § 3025 n.10. According to its Board of Editors,
[t]he Manual is... written by judges for judges after receiving the widest possible
range of suggestions and criticisms from the Bench and Bar. . . . In the opinion
of the Board of Editors, the Manual for Complex Litigation represents the neutral
distillation of the best judgment of lawyers and judges experienced in the handling
of complex cases.
MANUAL (4th ed. 1977) at xx-xxi.
10. MANUAL § 1.41 (4th ed. 1977). See MANUAL § 1.41-II (4th ed. 1977) for sample no-
communication rules and pretrial orders.
11. MANUAL § 1.41 n.43 (5th ed. 1982).
12. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
13. Id. at 104 n.21.
14. MANUAL § 1.41 (5th ed. 1982).
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restrictions, together with constitutional questions that have been raised, 15 have
triggered a new policy of nearly unregulated communications with class
members.
This Note will evaluate the new communications policy in terms of its ability
to control abuses of rule 23 by class action defendants 6 and their counsel.
First, present limits on judicial control of class action communication will
be discussed. This discussion will include an examination of Gulf Oil Co.
v. Bernard, the latest recommendations of the Federal Judicial Center, and
first amendment analysis of no-communication orders. Second, the new com-
munications policy will be evaluated to determine whether it is entirely con-
sistent with the underlying policies of rule 23, and whether narrow regulation
is needed to cure unwanted side effects of open communication with absent
class members. This evaluation will suggest that unregulated communication
will not ultimately further the purpose of rule 23, and that a need exists to
control defense communications in order to prevent subversion of rule 23
substantive po'cies. Third, means of improvement in the present policy will
be suggested, and these suggestions will be tested for consistency with rule
23's underlying policies, and for validity under the first amendment. This Note
concludes that the present policy of nearly unregulated communications with
absent class members is inadequate to deal with defense tactics that under-
mine the effectiveness of the class action device, and that alternatives exist
to alleviate this problem consistent with rule 23 and class action defendants'
constitutional rights.
I. CURRENT LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
COMMUNICATIONS
A. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard
In Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard,7 the Supreme Court ruled on the authority
of a district court to order judicial screening of communications between for-
15. See infra text accompanying notes 40-64.
16. A party becomes a class action defendant, for the purposes of this Note, at the time
a complaint is filed containing class action allegations.
17. 452 U.S. 89 (1981). Named plaintiffs were black employees alleging discrimination by
Gulf Oil Co. and its unions against plaintiffs and similarly situated employees in violation of
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The suit was prompted by dissatisfaction with a conciliation
agreement reached by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Gulf one month
prior to the filing of the class action. Soon after filing, plaintiffs' attorneys contacted a group
of Gulf employees concerning the action, and in response the defendant Gulf moved for a no-
communication order which was granted. Later, the district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants and plaintiffs appealed. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th
Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Bernard 1]. A divided Fifth Circuit panel reversed the district
court summary judgment but upheld the no-communication order, Bernard 1, 596 F.2d at 1262,
and on rehearing the Fifth Circuit en banc vacated the order in agreeing with the panel decision
to reverse and remand for trial, Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 478 (5th Cir. 1980)
19831
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mal parties, or their counsel, and absent class members.' 8 Specifically, the
Court questioned whether the no-communication order entered by the district
court was an "appropriate" use of rule 23(d) discretion.19 The Court held
that the order was not "appropriate," and therefore an abuse of discretion,
because the order did not further the underlying policies of rule 23.20 In a
unanimous opinion, the Court recognized that the broad order in question
was in conflict with the rule 23 objective of .'vindicat[ing] the rights of in-
dividuals who otherwise might not consider it worth the candle to embark
on litigation in which the optimum result might be more than consumed by
the cost.' ..2 Since the order prevented named plaintiffs from contacting ab-
sent class members, named plaintiffs were hampered in informing absent class
members of the existence of the suit, and in obtaining information about the
merits of the case from persons they sought to represent. 22 The concern of
the Court was that absent a specific finding of need for the order, the order
would create undue difficulties for named plaintiffs seeking redress via the
class action.23
In vacating the order in Gulf, the Court placed substantive limits on the
future use of no-communication orders. According to Gulf, whether an order
is "appropriate" under rule 23(d) is determined by a three-step analysis.24
First, the order must be examined for its consistency with rule 23 policy.2'
Second, if the order is in any way inconsistent with rule 23, the order must
be narrowly drawn to ensure that on balance the policies of rule 23 are being
furthered.2 6 This requires a court to support its order with a clear record and
specific findings. 27 To justify a no-communication order, the need to prevent
abuses must be outweighed by any conflicts which the order may have with
policies embodies in rule 23.28 Finally, the record must demonstrate actual
or threatened abuse of the class action through improper communications.29
As a practical matter, the Gulf decision is incomplete and imprecise guidance
[hereinafter cited as Bernard I1]. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question
whether the order limiting communications was constitutionally permissible, Gulf Oil Co. v. Ber-
nard, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980). However, the first amendment issue was never reached as the Court
decided Gulf on available non-constitutional, rule 23 grounds. Gulf, 452 U.S. at 99.
18. Id.
19. Id. The order in question in Gulf was taken nearly verbatim from the Manual's suggested
pretrial order found at § 1.41 (4th ed. 1977). Id. at 94 n.5.
20. See id. at 99-103.
21. Id. at 99 n.11 (citing Deposit Guar. Nat'l. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980)).
22. Id. at 101.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 99-103. See also Williams v. United States District Court, 658 F.2d 430, 435
(6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Southern Ry Co. v. Williams 454 U.S. 1128 (1981) (the Sixth
Circuit articulated the holding in Gulf into a three-part test).
25. Gulf, 452 U.S. at 101-03. See Williams, 658 F.2d at 435.
26. See Gulf, 452 U.S. at 101-02; Williams, 658 F.2d at 435.
27. Gulf, 452 U.S. at 101.
28. Id. at 101-02.
29. Id. at 102-04; Williams, 658 F.2d at 435.
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for a trial court contemplating the use of no-communication orders and should
discourage district courts from using such devices.3 0 The holding is incomplete
in the sense that it never indicates what standards should be followed for
the entry of a valid no-communication order. While the Court offered a three-
part analysis to test the validity of an order under rule 23(d), the Court also
noted that such an order is confined by first amendment considerations. The
Court, however, failed to provide any substantive guidelines on this issue.
Furthermore, Gulf is imprecise because rule 23's three-part analysis was not
thoroughly applied due to the exceptional facts of the case. Since the district
court entered the broad order with no specific findings of need, the balancing
test adopted by the Supreme Court in Gulf resolved the case easily without
discussing or weighing all possible relevant factors. The Gulf opinion is not
as helpful to a trial court considering a no-communication order in a closer
case with a more fully developed record. A trial court, therefore, may be
hesitant to enter a no-communication order given the uncertainties left in Gulf.
B. Manual for Complex Litigation
Prior to its 1982 edition, the Manual for Complex Litigation recommended
the use of local no-communication rules and pretrial orders in federal district
courts and these recommendations were widely followed.' On the basis of
Gulf, however, the Manual has significantly modified its section 1.41
recommendations. 32 While Gulf merely implemented standards for refined use
of no-communication orders, the latest Manual edition interprets Gulf to im-
pose severe restrictions on the use of such orders.
Judicial screening of communications is greatly restricted in the new recom-
mendations. The Manual suggests that Gulf be read liberally and that eight
rules should be followed before entry of a no-communication order.3 3 Five
of these rules incorporate the three-part test in Gulf by quoting specific passages
from Gulf and Williams v. United States District Court.34 The other three
rules state:
2. No order forbidding communications by formal parties or their counsel
with potential and actual class members should be entered without writ-
30. Since Gulf and Bernard HI, the cases indicate that trial courts are vacating, rather than
revising, previously entered no-communication orders. See, e.g., Zinser v. Continental Grain
Co., 660 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1981); Williams, 658 F.2d at 430; Marmol v. Adkins, 655 F.2d
594 (5th Cir. 1981); Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981);
Cada v. Costa Line, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 95, 98 (N.D. II1. 1981); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc.,
25 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 442 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 11, 1980). But see Resnick v. American
Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. 111. 1982).
31. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. But see Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975).





ten notice and opportunity for an evidentiary hearing, whether proposed
on motion of a party or on initiative of the court ....
7. The district court should examine the reported decisions of the cir-
cuit court of appeals of the circuit in which the district court is located
...to determine if there are further limitations on issuance of any such
order.
8. If the district court enters a valid order controlling specified abusive
communications, provision should be made for swift and liberal excep-
tions to the order.
35
These recommendations may have a significant impact on the use of no-
communication orders. The Manual is very influential,3 6 and at minimum its
suggestions may inhibit federal judges from entering such an order for fear
of reversal.
C. First Amendment Limits on No-Communication Orders
The first amendment is the greatest barrier to viability of no-communication
orders as a class action management tool. Although the holding in Gulf and
the new Manual position allow limited use of no-communication orders, courts
and commentators applying a constitutional analysis question whether any
remnant of the past practice can continue. Although the Supreme Court de-
clined to resolve this issue in Gulf,37 lower courts and commentators have
sharply criticized the orders as being unconstitutional "gag" orders, 31 and
have suggested that the order, as used in the past, is now proper in only the
most extreme case.
39
Whether a no-communication order is constitutionally infirm has turned
on its characterization as a prior restraint on speech. Analysis of judicial deci-
sions indicates that courts have taken conflicting positions on this matter.
A prior restraint has been defined as a "predetermined judicial prohibition
35. Id.
36. The Manual is highly respected among judges and lawyers and is the most widely used
source of class action management guidance. 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, at § 3025.
37. Gulf, 452 U.S. at 101-02 n.15, 103-04. While avoiding the constitutional issue, the Court
in Gulf also recognized in dicta that the entry of a no-communication order is also confined
by the first amendment. The Court did not suggest what substantive limits the first amendment
imposes on the use of such orders; however, the Court noted that "the order involved serious
restraints on expression ... [and] at minimum, counsels caution on the part of a district court
in drafting such an order, and attention to whether the restraint is justified by a likelihood of
serious abuses." Gulf, 452 U.S. at 104. The Court may have needlessly avoided the first amend-
ment issue. See 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 339, 361 n.166 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Bernard II, 619 F.2d at 466-78; Cada v. Costa Line, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 95 (N.D.
Ill. 1981); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 102-05 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Seymour, The Use of
Proof of Claim Forms and Gag Orders in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 CONN.
L. REv. 920, 939-43 (1978); Wilson, Control of Class Action Abuses through Regulation of Com-
munications, 4 CLASS AcTION REp. 632 (1977); Comment, supra note 8, 1980 DuKE L.J. at 360;
89 HARV. L. REV., supra note 7, at 1600-01; 49 GEo. WAsH. L. REv., supra note 7, at 339.
39. See supra note 38.
[Vol. 59:133
19831 RULE 23(d) "GAG" ORDERS
restraining specified expression""' which is accorded a "heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. 1 In Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates,'42 the
district court did not find a no-communication ban taken verbatim from the
Manual to be a prior restraint.'3 The court noted that one aspect of a prior
restraint is that violation entails immediate and irreversible punishment, and
that a violator cannot challenge the constitutionality of the ban as a defense
to contempt. 44 The court distinguished the ban at issue by entertaining a con-
stitutional defense to the contempt charge." This protection, in addition to
the ban's exemption for communication made pursuant to an asserted con-
stitutional right,'6 supported the court's finding that the local "gag" rule was
not a prior restraint." Thus, the heavy presumption against constitutionality
was not applied in Waldo, and the court justified the ban by asserting a com-
pelling governmental interest in the prevention of potential abuse of rule 23,
and on a specific finding that the ban was the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing that end.' 8
It would appear that the more cognizable position, however, is that no-
communication orders are a prior restraint on speech. In Bernard I,1 the
Fifth Circuit gave exhaustive treatment to the first amendment issue. The court
first identified the four characteristics of a prior restraint:
40. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Bernard 1, 619 F.2d at 467.
41. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975). See also Nebraska
Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
42. 433 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. La. 1977).
43. Id. at 789.
44. Id.
45. The Waldo court permitted a constitutional defense to the contempt charge by relying
on the reasoning in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). In both Waldo and Chicago Council of Lawyers the prior restraint
status of a local rule was at issue. The court in Chicago Council of Lawyers did not find the
local court rules to be a prior restraint because the enactment of the rules was an act of the
court in its "legislative" role, 522 F.2d at 248. Thus, the unconstitutionality of the order could
be used as a defense to contempt, just as anyone charged with violation of a statute could raise
such a defense. Although Waldo and Chicago Council of Lawyers were concerned with the validity
of local court rules, the analysis is also applicable to no-communication orders. The Manual's
suggested local rule is nearly identical to the suggested pretrial order, MANUAL § 1.41-I1 (4th
ed. 1977); moreover, since the orders were entered promptly without hearing in potential and
actual class actions, the orders are in a sense an act of the court in its legislative role. See e.g.,
cases cited within the commentary in note 7 supra.
46. Nor does the rule forbid communications protected by constitutional right. However,
in the latter instance the person making the communication shall within five days
after such communication file with the court a copy of such communication, if
in writing, or an accurate and substantially complete summary of the communica-
tion if oral.
MANUAL § 1.41-11 (4th ed. 1977).
47. Waldo, 433 F. Supp. at 788-89.
48. Id. at 789-93. Cf. NOW v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1176, 1178-79 (D. Minn. Dee. 30, 1977) (court found order a prior restraint, but upheld
it in face of heavy presumption against constitutionality).
49. 619 F.2d at 466-78.
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1. Origin. A prior restraint is generally judicial rather than legislative
in origin . . . .The essence of prior restraint is that it places specific
communications under the personal censorship of the judge.
2. Purpose.... ITihe sole purpose of a prior restraint is suppression
rather than punishment ...
3. Means of enforcement. . . . 'Punishment by contempt is an impor-
tant attribute of a "prior restraint" that distinguishes it from a criminal
statute that forbids a certain type of expression.' [citation omitted] The
penalty is thus both more swiftly imposed and less subject to the mitigating
safeguards of the criminal justice system than is the punishment for viola-
tion of a statute ...
4. Means of constitutional challenge. While the unconstitutionality of
a statute may be raised as a defense to prosecution for its violation, a
litigant who disobeys an injunction is precluded from raising its constitu-
tional invalidity as a defense in contempt proceedings. 0
After finding the order in question to meet these four characteristics, the court
applied the "presumption" against prior restraints. "It [the order] must fit
within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior
restraints. It must prevent direct, immediate and irreparable damage, and it
must be the least restrictive means of doing so. Finally, it must comport with
required procedural safeguards.'" 1 The court found that the no-communication
order at issue failed to fulfill these requirements and concluded that the order
was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.52
Several factors suggest that the Fifth Circuit's position is superior. First,
the case relied upon by the Waldo court, Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer," did not apply prior restraint analysis to judicial "gag" rules, but
rather was primarily concerned with orders or rules restraining speech in the
context of a criminal trial.-" Chicago Council of Lawyers recognized a dif-
ference in treatment between orders entered in a criminal trial and those entered
in a civil action. In criminal trials, the accused enjoys extraordinary safeguards
to a fair trial under the sixth amendment that are not provided to civil litigants,
and accordingly a trial court in a criminal case has a more compelling interest
than would be present in a civil case to justify a restraint on speech. 6 The
law relied upon by Waldo, therefore, should not be extended unthinkingly
to orders restraining class action parties and counsel."s In addition, permit-
ting a violator to contest the constitutionality of the order as a defense to
50. Id. at 467-71.
51. Id. at 473.
52. Id. at 477.
53. 522 F.2d 242. (7th Cir. 1975).
54. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 522 F.2d at 248-49. See also In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176,
183-85 (D.C. Cir. 1979); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1971); Central S. C. Chapter,
Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1188-89 (D.S.C. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1152 (E.D. Va. 1976),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
55. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 522 F.2d at 257-58. See also In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at
192-83; Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 363-64.
56. See 49 GEo. WAsH. L. REv., supra note 7, at 351 n.99.
57. See Comment, supra note 8, 1980 DUKE L.J. at 371-72.
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contempt does not lessen the order's chilling effect. Although the Bernard
I court did not address the approach taken in Waldo," the court explained
that "the defense is so freighted with preconditions and uncertainties that
it [the exemption for constitutional speech] is little comfort to attorney or
party." 5 9 Even the Supreme Court in Gulf agreed in dicta that the exemption
does "little to narrow the scope of the limitation on speech imposed by the
court. ' 6 ' The exemption has also been criticized as being in violation of the
Hickman v. Taylor" work product rule, 2 and as being impermissible, even
if compliance was feasible, because the speaker still has the burden of justifying
his speech.63
Whatever vitality no-communication orders retained after Gulf and the re-
cent Manual recommendation is diminished when the order is subjected to
a first amendment analysis. Since a broad order is a prior restraint implicating
protected speech,"' a moving party can only overcome the great presumption
of unconstitutionality by showing that direct, immediate and irreparable harm
would occur. Hence, the entry of a no-communication order is made extremely
difficult.
II. UNREGULATED COMMUNICATIONS AND RULE 23 SUBSTANTIVE
POLICY
The policy of restricting judicial power to regulate communications
presumably has evolved because it is more consistent with the purpose of rule
23. Gains made by recent developments, however, may be diminished because
an open communications policy encourages the use of questionable defense
tactics that are inconsistent with rule 23. 61
58. Bernard II, 619 F.2d at 467-68.
59. Id. at 470. The Fifth Circuit as well as other courts and commentators have urged that
the constitutional right exemption in the order is illusory. See Gulf, 452 U.S. at 103 n.17; Zarate,
86 F.R.D. at 103-04; L. Tunm, AamacAN CONSTITUToNAL LAW 726 n.2 (1978); Seymour, supra
note 39, at 942; Comment, supra note 8, 1980 DUyrE L.J. at 372; Comment, supra note 7, 55
N.Y.U. L. Rav. at 679-83; 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv., supra note 7, at 358, 362; Recent Developments,
88 HARv. L. REv. 1911, 1921 n.74 (1975).
60. Gulf, 452 U.S. at 103 n.17.
61. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
62. Bernard I1, 619 F.2d at 471; Seymour, supra note 38, at 942.
63. Comment, supra note 7, 55 N.Y.U. L. Ray. at 677-83.
64. See infra note 65.
65. The primary problem with no-communication orders as they were previously used was
that the orders frustrated plaintiffs in realizing the benefits of rule 23. Seesupra text accompany-
ing notes 21-23. The Supreme Court noted that a broad no-communication order unconstitu-
tionally restricts plaintiff's speech rights in regard to "collective efforts to gain economic benefits
accorded a specific group of persons under federal law." Gulf, 452 U.S. at 98 n.9. See United
Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). While limits on judicial screening
of communication enable plaintiffs to more readily achieve the intended use of rule 23, the op-
posite side of the coin is that defendants consequently have more freedom to engage in com-
munications with absent class members. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, No. C80-921
and No. C81-1553, slip. op. (N.D. Ga. August 24, 1983); Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., MCA
76-28 (N.D. Fla. Order of Dec. 22, 1981) (based on the court's interpretation of Gulf, defend-
ants were not ordered to refrain from communicating with absent class members until after defen-
1983]
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A. Defense Tactics Under an Open Communications Approach
Class action defendants have a great incentive to avoid or minimize class
recovery through any possible means. Exposure to class liability can be tremen-
dous, especially in antitrust suits where damages are trebled. 66 Even in civil
rights class suits where damages may or may not be sought, defendants may
still be assessed with plaintiffs' attorney fees as well as their own costs in
litigating the protracted suit.67 Defendants, therefore, have vigorously opposed
class actions, and this tension between parties to the action has led one federal
judge to observe that "it appears that unremitting social and economic war-
fare is being waged in the class action field."
61
Class action defendants have employed various controversial means involv-
ing communication with absent class members to reduce potential liability
69
through prevention of class certification under rule 2(c)(1).70 One tactic has
been the solicitation of affidavits of non-interest from absent class members."'
Defendants have used such affidavits to contest the numerosity and represen-
tation issues at the certification hearing." Courts are split on whether this
dants had made the abusive communications). This Note contends that preventive controls are
still appropriate on defense communication.
66. See Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-
The Twenty-third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1971); Simon, Class
Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 7 LINCOLN L. REv. 20, 34 (1971).
67. See 89 HARv. L. REv., supra note 7, at 1325 & n.31.
68. Becker, Introduction: Use and Abuse of Class Actions Under Amended Rule 23, 68 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 991, 992 (1974).
69. Ethical considerations prevent defense counsel from making contacts with absent class
members. See Gulf, 452 U.S. at 104 n.21. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104
provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of client a lawyer may not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of represen-
tation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless
he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is author-
ized by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than
the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.
As DR 7-104 has been applied in class suits, this duty does not attach until the class has been
certified under rule 23(b)(3) and the opt-out period has expired, or in the case of other rule
23 actions at the time of class certification. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, at § 2730d; see also
Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n., 95 F.R.D. 372, 376-77 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Winfield v. St.
Joe Paper Co., MCA 76-28 (N.D. Fla. Order of Dec. 22, 1981). This view holds that an other-
wise unrepresented absent class member is not represented by class counsel until after the member's
inclusion as an "official" class member at the time of certification. However, at least one court
has recognized the constructive attomey-client relationship that exists from the time of filing
between class counsel and absent class members. Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508
F. Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981). In any event, defendants are not bound by DR 7-104 and
may communicate with absent class members in the ordinary course of business. 2 H. NEWBERG,
supra note 2, at §§ 2720d, 2730d.
70. Rule 23(c)(1) states: "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
71. See infra note 75.
72. Rule 23 provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
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tactic can defeat certification; a majority of courts have recognized that such
affidavits have probative value in regard to certification issues." The view
of the minority, however, is nonetheless persuasive. The minority position
questions whether such affidavits are the result of a rational class member
acting in self-interest, or rather the result of overreaching defendants soliciting
unsophisticated litigants with the aim of stifling the action. 74 Moreover, courts
aligning themselves with the minority view recognize that absent class members
are often subject to economic leverage applied by the class action defendant, 7
and are therefore skeptical of "irrational" affidavits that are seemingly against
the absent member's interest. 76 Yet, as long as the unregulated communica-
tions policy continues, and courts are amenable to the use of affidavits to
defeat a class, defendants will undoubtably pursue this tactic.
Rule 23(b)(3) damage actions afford absent members a choice whether to
be included in the suit; accordingly, defendants have solicited absent class
members to opt-out according to rule 23(c)(2) procedure. 77 This tactic is de-
signed to reduce the size of the class and hence reduce potential liability. If
enough members opt-out, the class can be stifled completely for lack of
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, . . .(4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a)(1), (4).
73. See Nesenhoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Matarazzo v. Friendly
Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Greisler v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.,
1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,455 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Van Landingham v. Denny's Restaurants,
Inc., No. 69-424 (D. Or. Order of Nov. 7, 1969); Schulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 207-09
(D.D.C. 1969); Weingartner v. Union Oil Co. of California, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,757
(N.D. Cal. 1966); but see Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n., 395 F.2d 420, 428 (3d
Cir. 1968); Grogan v. American Brands, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 579, 582 (M.D.N.C. 1976); JWT Inc.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 139 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Northern Acceptance Trust
1065 v. Amfac, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 487, 491 (D. Hawaii 1971); Moss v. Lane, 50 F.R.D. 122, 125-26
(W.D. Va. 1970).
74. See Grogan, 70 F.R.D. at 582; Moss, 50 F.R.D. at 125-26; see also 89 HAgv. L. REV., supra
note 7, at 1599-1600. In Northern Acceptance Trust, the "[d]efendant used informal and apparently
clandestine efforts to secure affidavits from members of the class plaintiff purported to repre-
sent, denying that plaintiff represented the affiants. The court found that the affidavits did not
contain anything of persuasive evidentiary value." 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, at § 2720d
n.88a. "There is respectable authority for plaintiffs' contention that defendants violated both
the spirit and letter of Rule 23." Northern Acceptance Trust, 51 F.R.D. at 491.
75. Class actions often pit employees against employers, franchisees against franchisors, or
others in ongoing business relationships. Even when plaintiff class members are not unsophisticated
litigants, "the class opponent is likely to have greater financial resources than the class attorney,
and will engage in repeated communications with class members, thereby intimidating class members
or undermining their confidence in the class attorney's representation." 89 HAgv. L. REv., supra
note 7, at 1600.
76. See Moss, 50 F.R.D. at 125-26; see also 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, at § 2720d; Hom-
burger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 CoLum L. R v. 609, 637 (1971).
77. See, e.g., Ehrhardt v. Prudential Group, Inc., 629 F.2d 843, 843 (2d Cir. 1980); Kleiner
v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, No. C80-921 and C81-1553, slip. op. (N.D. Ga. August 23, 1983);
Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981); Ungar
v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,361 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Defendants
have also made attempts to intimidate class members in rule 23(b)(2) actions where money damages
are sought in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief. See Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co.,
MCA 76-28 (N.D. Fla. Order of Dec. 22, 1981).
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numerosity.78 This mode of defense is also suspect, and tantamount to ad-
judication by coercion in many cases. Ordinarily, an absent member will sit
back in the windfall position of being able to collect on a claim that would
have never been brought because the potential recovery would be less than
the expense to litigate the claim. Thus, a rational absent class member will
simply not opt-out."' Absent class members, however, are fair game for an
opt-out campaign for the same reason they are vulnerable to affidavit solicita-
tion: absent members are in general legally unsophisticated and often under
the defendant's economic influence. The impact of a successful opt-out cam-
paign is that viable claims are extinguished, regardless of their merit, since
members cannot afford to litigate their claims individually. While such a
solicitation tactic is controversial, an unregulated communications policy leaves
defendants free to pursue this option.
Defendants have also pursued the tactic of individual settlements with ab-
sent class members to prevent certification and to reduce potential liability.8
Prior to the class determination or a motion to dismiss the class allegation,
settlements may be regulated by an "appropriate" rule 23(d) order. In in-
stances where the district court fails to enter such an order, however, defend-
ants have significant freedom. After certification or at the time of a motion
to deny the class, the court's power to approve a settlement emanates from
rule 23(e).11 Courts have construed rule 23(e) to prohibit only the settlement
of the entire action without court approval, and therefore have permitted defen-
dants to seek individual settlements. 2 It is unclear whether court approval
of individual settlements is required under rule 23(e) in instances where so
many absent members settle that the class action can no longer proceed for
lack of numerosity1 3 Some courts have indicated that defendants may diminish
and consequently decertify a class through settlements as long as the rights
78. Class certification does not guarantee that the suit will be tried as a class action. If enough
opt-outs are secured, defendants may move to decertify the class. "[A]n order under this sub-
division may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1).
79. See Homburger, supra note 76, at 637. Experience has shown that only about one per-
cent of absent class members who receive rule 23(c)(2) notice actually opt-out. Pomerantz, New
Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259,
1266 (1970). See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106,
1138 (7th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as In re GM Corp.] (99.97 % of potential class of 3500
did not opt-out).
80. See 89 HAriv. L. REv., supra note 7, at 1546 & n.56.
81. "Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e). See
generally 89 HAxv. L. REv., supra note 7, at 1546-52.
82. See In re GM Corp., 594 F.2d at 1138-39; Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers
Int'l, 455 F.2d 770, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1972); Cada v. Costa Line, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 95, 98 (N.D.
Ill. 1981); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639, 642-43 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismis-
sed, 541 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1976); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Minneapolis Shareholders Co.,
425 F. Supp. 145, 150 (D. Minn. 1977).
83. In re GM Corp., 594 F.2d at 1138 n.58.
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of remaining unsettled class members are not affected." According to the
court in Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Minneapolis Shareholders Co., "an im-
proper effect only occurs when the settlements impinge on the substance of
plaintiffs' complaints."" Thus, only if dismissal of the class would leave the
unsettled class members with meritless individual claims would dismissal of
the class be improper under rule 23(e). This view, however, mistakenly assumes
that individual members in every class action can afford to refile and assert
their claims, and hence defendants will have an incentive to satisfy these re-
maining claims if the class does not proceed.
Other courts have advanced a more realistic position, recognizing the tremen-
dous opportunity for defendants to use the individual settlement technique
to circumvent class liability. Accordingly, one court has refused to dismiss
a class under rule 23(e) due to lack of numerosity caused by individual set-
tlements on the basis that such an order would effectively preclude remaining
unsettled members from a hearing on the merits or claim satisfaction.6 The
court emphasized the factors of unsophisticated litigants, inability to main-
tain individual claims, and economic relationships. If the reasoning of the
Rockler court is applied, defendants could easily short-circuit class actions.
Defendants could stifle the class by offering premium settlements "to selected
members of the class, including named plaintiffs, whose resources or claims
are necessary. ."I" to sustain numerosity or litigation expenses. The danger
also exists that defendants could mislead class members about the strength
of their claims by offering nominal consideration in exchange for releases
which "may amount to little more than a request that class members opt-out
of the class."' 8 Unfortunately, the issue whether rule 23(e) permits stifling
of class actions through individual settlements has not been definitively re-
solved. Due to courts' reluctance to screen communications under rule 23(d),
defendants will likely employ individual settlements to effectively minimize
the potential for class liability.
B. Conflict with Rule 23 Policies
The defense tactics discussed above contravene the underlying policies of
rule 23 in three important ways. First, these tactics are inconsistent with the
class action policy of providing a forum for redress of valid claims that other-
wise could not be brought.9 The class action is an invention of equity that
84. Weight Watchers, Inc., 455 F.2d at 774-75; Rodgers, 70 F.R.D. at 642-43; Vernon J.
Rockier & Co., 425 F. Supp. at 150.
85. Vernon J. Rockier & Co., 425 F. Supp. at 150.
86. Banks v. Lockheed - Ga. Co., 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ga. 1968), discussed in American
Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 576-77 (D. Md. 1974). See also In re Interna-
tional House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation, 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,864 (W.D. Mo.
1972); Dole, The Settlement of Class Actionsfor Damages, 71 CoLuM. L. Ray. 970, 991-92 (1971).
87. 89 HARv. L. REv., supra note 7, at 1547.
88. In re GM Corp., 594 F.2d at 1140 n.60.
89. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1969).
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attempts to further the general notion of complete justice by providing a
mechanism for easy joinder of small claimants to assert a collective interest
in remedy of a common wrong.90 In the many cases where individual claims
are non-maintainable, defense tactics that stifle the class have the effect of
subverting this mechanism by denying small claimants their day in court."
By preventing class relief, the defendant in effect has the unilateral power
to dispose of claims without regard to their merit.
Second, these defense tactics are inconsistent with the rule 23 policy of
judicial economy. As the Supreme Court stated in Gulf, "Rule 23 expresses
'a policy in favor of having litigation in which common interests, or common
questions of law or fact prevail, disposed of where feasible in a single
lawsuit." ' 92 Tactics that attempt to persuade non-participation in the class
are in conflict with this policy. Courts are burdened by duplicative suits
whenever class members can afford to bring a separate suit, 93 and, in any
case, these tactics deprive the court of the ability to end the matter through
res judicata. The present communications policy that encourages such defense
behavior often serves little purpose other than defendant's pecuniary gain.
Finally, these tactics undermine the purpose and function of the class notice
which issues from the court under rule 23(c)(3). When rule 23(b)(3) does pro-
vide for exclusion from the class in damage actions,
[i]t is essential that the class members' decision to participate or to withdraw
be made on the basis of [an] independent analysis of its [the class member's]
own self-interest .... The mechanism selected for accomplishing this is
the class notice, which is designed to present the relevant facts in an un-
biased format.'
Permitting defendants, whose interests are at odds with class members, to
communicate with the class concerning their participation in the suit is in-
imical to the purpose of the notice. Recent cases suggest that given the op-
portunity, defendants can, without threat of significant sanction, intention-
ally sabotage the class notice policy.' 5
90. Id.
91. See Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968).
92. Gulf, 452 U.S. at 99 n.11, citing Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152,
163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975).
93. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1114(5th Cir. 1978), affirmed sub nom., Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); Dubose v. Harris, 434 F. Supp. 227, 230 (D.
Conn. 1977).
94. Impervious Paint Indus., 508 F. Supp. at 723.
95. In Ehrhardt v. Prudential Group, Inc., 629 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1980), a rule 23(b)(3) action
where the lower court did not implement a no-communication order, the defendant sent class
members "letters commenting on the litigation, warning them that a successful defense might
make them liable for costs, and urging them to disassociate themselves from the lawsuit."
Id. at 845. This information concerning liability for costs had been specifically excluded from
the class notice prepared during the certification hearing because there was no legal precedent
supporting the idea that class members would be liable for costs. Id. The lower court's invoca-
tion of the sanction of contempt was overturned because no specific order of the court had
been violated. Id. at 846. The circuit did note, however, that the remedial measure imposed,
assessing the cost of a corrective notice on the defendant and extending the time limit for class
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These inconsistencies indicate that the present communications policy is
ultimately inadequate to further the purpose of rule 23. Although tactics en-
couraged by an unregulated communications policy invite the use of fraud
and coercion, instances of misconduct may not in themselves justify a need
for judicial control over defense communications. However, these tactics, even
when used in good faith, are inconsistent with the underlying aims of rule
23. Narrow regulation of defense communication with absent class members,
therefore, may be preferable to the present policy which tolerates the risk
of abuses in exchange for little substantive benefit.
III. "APPROPRIATE" CONTROLS ON DEFENSE COMMUNICATION
The foregoing analysis indicates a need for preventive regulation of defense
communications with absent class members. One means to control abusive
communications would be to implement a local district court rule. Such a
rule would in all potential and actual class actions prohibit defendants and
their counsel from communicating with absent class members concerning the
suit without leave of the court. Alternatively, a no-communication pretrial
order limiting only defense communications could be promptly entered without
hearing in all potential or actual class actions on motion of the court or a
party. This ensuing discussion will analyze the feasibility of these proposals.
A. Consistency with Rule 23 Policy
A local district court rule which subjects defense communication to judicial
screening would be entirely consistent with rule 23, and therefore would be
a valid exercise of rule-making power. The statutory sources of a court's rule-
making power are rule 8396 and 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (Rules Enabling Act). 97
members to decide whether to be included in the action, id. at 845, counteracted defendant's
lack of judgment. Id. at 846.
In Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981), a no-
communication order had been entered, but on the basis of Bernard 11 the court subsequently
vacated the order. With the no-communication order no longer in effect, representatives of
one defendant embarked on a program to solicit opt-outs which allegedly involved threats to
class members of commercial retaliation. Id. at 722. As in Ehrhardt, the defendant in Impervious
Paint Indus. supplied class members with false information that had been specifically excluded
from the class notice, id. at 723. The court attempted to remedy the impropriety through corrective
notice to the class, and by restoring opt-outs back to the class with members having additional
time to decide whether to participate in the action. Id. at 724.
96. Rule 83 states in full:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time
to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these
rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In
all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice
in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
FED. R. Cxv. P. 83.
97. The Rules Enabling Act states: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act
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Courts have interpreted these statutes to uphold local court rules which are
consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and do not modify
"substantive" rights.98
Whether restrictions on communications with absent class members would
be in any way inconsistent with rule 23 or constitute a modification of a party's
substantive rights is unlikely; yet possible inconsistencies have been raised.
Commentators have suggested that an order restricting defense communica-
tion prevents absent class members from receiving needed information for
an objective, independent decision whether to support or participate in a class
action.9 This concern, however, ignores the class notice as the proper
mechanism for providing class members with relevant information.'10 The class
notice insures that the views of both sides are expressed, and that only rele-
vant, unbiased information is released to the class. 1"" "Gag" orders or rules
restricting defendants also have been criticized because such orders inhibit
defendants' ability to gather information from class members necessary to
contest class certification and the merits of the suit.102 Yet, there are many
viable alternatives to gather needed information, and "[i]t is difficult to believe
that adequate information ... cannot be obtained from such available sources
... " Moreover, rule 23 does not contemplate absent class members to
be "parties" who can be subject to information requests without leave of
the court.'"" Permitting information requests from absent class members "so
shifts the burdens in the action that the passive role of the class member is
destroyed and the class action's potential as a semi-public enforcement
mechanism is critically reduced." 105 Thus, judicial screening of communica-
tions in the manner proposed is overall more consistent with rule 23 aims,
and constitutes a valid use of rule-making power under rule 83 and section
2071.
Likewise, pretrial no-communication orders would be a feasible means of
regulating class action defendants' conduct. 06 Although Gulf and other cases
of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules
shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976).
98. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 832 (1975); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 92 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See also 88 HARv.
L. REV. at 1913-16 (1975).
99. See 89 HARV. L. REv., supra note 7, at 1598-99, Note, Restrictions on Communications
in Class Action Suits and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 153, 175 (1981).
100. See Ehrhardt, 629 F.2d at 846; In re Gypsum Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d 1123, 1125 (9th
Cir. 1977); Impervious Paint Indus., 508 F. Supp. at 723.
101. Impervious Paint Indus., 508 F. Supp. at 723.
102. See Comment, Party Discovery Techniques: A Threat to Underlying Federal Policies,
68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1063, 1092 (1974); 89 HARv. L. REv., supra note 7, at 1600.
103. Comment, supra note 102, at 1092.
104. Comment, supra note 102, at 1092. See also Resnick v. American Dental Assn'n, 95
F.R.D. 273, 377 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
105. Comment, supra note 102, at 1092. See also Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, No.
C80-921 and C81-1553, slip. op. (N.D. Ga. August 24, 1983).
106. See Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977);
Zarate, 86 F.R.D. at 92 n.18, 94. In addition to rule 83, rule 23(d) authorizes the issuance of
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state that an order must be based on a hearing and specific findings of fact
concerning threatened or actual abuses," 7 this requirement should not apply
to an order which screens only defense communication. The requirements of
a hearing and specific findings of fact emanate from cases in which courts
were faced with conflicting policy considerations: plaintiff's uninhibited use
of the class action device versus the potential of abuse from unauthorized
communications with absent class members.' 8 A pretrial order which restrains
only defense communication does not involve assessment of conflicting policy
considerations. As the analysis herein shows, such an order would be com-
pletely consistent with rule 23.09 Hence, the entry of a limited no-
communication order would be an "appropriate" use of rule 23(d) trial court
discretion."0
B. First Amendment Requirements
Judicial screening of defense communication is not only permissible under
rule 23, but is also not violative of defendants' constitutional rights. Regula-
tion of communication with absent class members proposed herein is
distinguishable from no-communication orders frequently entered prior to the
Fifth Circuit decision in Bernard 11. The holding in Bernard 11, that a no-
communication order is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, " ' was
based on the order's harmful effect on plaintiff's protected speech interests. " 2
The Bernard 11 court, however, did not reach the question of first amend-
ment implications of a "gag" order on defendant's speech interests.' '3 Analysis
indicates that such orders are not in conflict with first amendment
considerations.
"appropriate orders," FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d). The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976),
"authorizes rulemaking and is not a source of power for the issuance of orders." Zarate, 86
F.R.D. at 92.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29. See also Bernard I, 619 F.2d at 478-81 (Toflat,
J., concurring); Coles, 560 F.2d at 189; Zarate, 86 F.R.D. at 93.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. See also Bernard II, 619 F.2d at 480; Coles,
560 F.2d at 189; Zarate, 86 F.R.D. at 91-92.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95, 99-105.
110. The ultimate question in Gulf "is whether the limiting order .. is consistent with the
general policies embodied in Rule 23, which governs class actions in federal court." Gulf, 452
U.S. at 99. If an order is entirely consistent with rule 23, the need for balancing and specific
findings of fact seem to disappear. This conclusion is supported by the concurring opinion in
Bernard If, 619 F.2d at 478-81 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). "The general principle restated by the
Sargeant court [that issuance of an order without adequate statement of the reasons therefor
does not meet minimum standards of procedural fairness] applies to any court order that is
based on the court's assessment of conflicting evidence or policy considerations." Id. at 480.
The concurring opinion went on to note that "[o]f course, there are some communications that
a court may restrict, in the interests of the administration of justice, without making findings
or even considering the facts of the case." Id. at 481 n.2.
I11. Bernard 11, 619 F.2d at 477.
112. See supra note 65.
113. But see Resnick, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (conclusion reached without analysis




Unlike plaintiff communication with absent class members, defense com-
munication does not involve political or ideological expression. Rather, the
sole purpose of such communication is to minimize or avoid liability. In first
amendment terms, defense communication with absent class members would
be characterized as "commercial speech," defined as "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.""' The Supreme
Court has perceived that "the failure to distinguish between commercial and
non-commercial speech 'could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process,
of the force of the [First] Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter
kind of speech."" 15 Although Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York" 6
argued that speech can never be strictly labeled as either commercial or non-
commercial for purposes of first amendment protection,' 7 the majority held
that first amendment commercial speech analysis will apply even though a
plausible political implication exists in speech that is primarily related to the
speaker's economic interest." 8 The instant proposals, therefore, should be
analyzed as regulation of commercial speech.
The proposals regulate speech in two ways. First, the screening process of
the court would presumably filter out and ban all untruthful and misleading
communications. Second, truthful speech would be regulated in the sense that
its dissemination would be delayed by the screening process. This type of
regulation does not foreclose speech, but rather subjects the communication
to limits on the time of dissemination.
Although only implicating commercial speech, the instant proposals are still
a prior restraint on speech. The mode of suppression is the same as confronted
by the Bernard II court, but unlike the situation in Bernard 11, only defend-
ants and their counsel are restrained. The issue thus presented is whether the
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality of prior restraints is applicable in
both commercial and noncommercial speech contexts. In Bernard II, the court
found that a prior restraint on noncommercial speech could only be justified
by a showing of direct, immediate and irreparable harm." 9 There is some
question, however, that this high standard also applies to a prior restraint
affecting only commercial speech.
Commercial speech is accorded a lesser degree of first amendment protec-
tion than noncommercial speech.' 0 The Supreme Court has only recently
acknowledged that commercial speech is even worthy of protection;' 2 '
114. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980).
115. Id. at 562 n.5, quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
116. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
117. Id. at 579-83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 562 n.5.
119. Bernard II, 619 F.2d at 473.
120. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56; Virginia Pharmacy
Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
121. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455; Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 758-60.
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moreover, the protection afforded is limited to speech that is neither misleading
nor related to unlawful activity.' The value of commercial speech, and thus
the reason for its protection, is in its informational value to the listener.123
However, two features of commercial speech preclude full constitutional pro-
tection. First, information in commercial speech is within the special knowledge
of the speaker, and thus the objective truth of the message is more readily
verified by the speaker rather than the audience. 2 Second, since commercial
speech is motivated by economic interest, "there is little likelihood of its be-
ing chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.""'2 Therefore, a lesser
degree of constitutional protection is "necessary to insure that the flow of
truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.' 126
Although the first amendment provides protection for truthful commercial
speech, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that such speech is not entirely
immune from government regulation.'" Commercial speech, even when
truthful, may be subject to regulation "that might be impermissible in the
realm of non-c-immercial speech."' 28 Government may place restrictions on
the time, place and manner of dissemination to prevent deception provided
such restriction serves "a significant governmental interest, and that in doing
so they [government] leave open ample channels for communication of the
information."129
In light of the Supreme Court's treatment of commercial speech, it is
unreasonable to presume that the standard for justification of a prior restraint
is the same regardless of the nature of the speech implicated. A standard lower
than a showing of direct, immediate, and irreparable harm should apply to
justify a prior restraint implicating only commercial speech. A more ap-
propriate standard that courts should adopt is the standard employed to review
statutory restrictions on commercial speech: that a substantial governmental
interest is directly advanced by the regulation. 130 There is clearly a significant
government interest in fair administration of justice and prevention of rule
23 abuse to justify the restriction. Also, the proposals leave open channels
for class members to receive the restricted information via communications
122. See Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563-64; Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979);
Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771.
123. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563; Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 765, 780
(Stewart, J., concurring).
124. CentralHudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6; Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
125. Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. See also Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S.
at 564 n.6; Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10.
126. Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
127. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 562-64; Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
716 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 770. The Court has
twice noted that the commercial speech attributes of greater objectivity and hardiness "may also
make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints." Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10; Virginia
Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
128. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456. See Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5, 9; Friedman,
440 U.S. at 20; Carey, 431 U.S. at 711-12.
129. Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771. See also Carey 431 U.S. at 712 n.6 (Powell,
J., concurring), 716-17 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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by named plaintiffs and their counsel and the class notice. Therefore, judicial
screening of defense communication with absent class members is a feasible
improvement over the present policy.
First amendment scrutiny does not end when a restraint has been shown
to be justified. Limits on any type of speech must also be shown to be the
least restrictive alternative to achieve the desired end."' Courts and commen-
tators have suggested many less restrictive alternatives. One suggestion has
been to redraft the no-communication order to prohibit only the unapproved
dissemination of specified forms of abusive communications." ' This alter-
native would restrain only constitutionally unprotected speech. Both the Waldo
court and the Manual have noted, however, that "as a practical matter ....
the ingenuity of those determined to wrongly take advantage of the class
action procedure would likely prevail over any such attempt at prohibition
by itemization." 3 Another suggestion would require only the filing with the
court of a copy of proposed communication with absent class members, and
would rely on corrective notices to remedy any abuses.' 34 This suggestion is
defective because class members may have already taken action, such as an
opt-out or settlement, before the correction is issued.'3 Finally, courts have
used various after-the-fact remedies to repair damage caused by defendants. 36
Unfortunately, whether such remedies can save a class action once defendants
have exerted their influence is speculative. There is no clear evidence that once
a class action is "poisoned" it can be cured.' 37 Hence, the instant proposals
seem to be the least restrictive alternative to prevent adverse effects on the
administration of justice and the underlying policies of rule 23. The proposals,
therefore, do not run afoul of the first amendment.
CONCLUSION
District courts can no longer prohibit at will all unapproved communica-
tion by parties and counsel with absent class members. The decision in Gulf,
the latest Manual recommendations, and first amendment considerations have
cumulatively narrowed trial court discretion under rule 23(d). A policy of nearly
unregulated communication with absent class members has evolved from these
recent developments; however, this policy has been shown to be inadequate
to further the policies embodied in rule 23. Specifically, open communica-
130. See Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
131. See id. at 564-65; Bernard 11, 619 F.2d at 473.
132. Comment, supra note 8, 1980 DuKE L.J. at 380. See, e.g., Belcher v. Bassett Furniture
Indus. Inc., 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1171, 1171-72 (W.D. Va. 1976) (court drafted and implemented
no-communication order limiting only itemized abuses).
133. Waldo, 433 F. Supp. at 791-92. See also MANuAL at 2 (4th ed. Supp. 1977).
134. See 89 HARV. L. Rav., supra note 7, at 1601-02.
135. See Waldo, 433 F. Supp. at 792 n.10; MANUAL at 2 (4th ed. Supp. 1977); Note, supra
note 99, at 180.
136. See supra note 95.
137. MAuAL § 1.41 n.43 (5th ed. 1982).
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tions encourages defense tactics which undermine the effectiveness of the class
action device. The shortcomings of the present policy, however, can be cor-
rected by use of district court rules or pretrial orders which screen defense
communication with absent class members. Such regulation would more fully
realize the underlying policies of rule 23 and would not impinge on class ac-
tion defendants' constitutional rights.
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